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1 Introduction
The strength of the not-for-prot sector has long puzzled economists in
the light of the basic assumption that nancial incentives are an important
engine of economic activity in a market economy.1 The existing view of not-
for-prots is that they are a second-best response to certain types of incentive
problems.2 One set of theories focusses on contract failure (Hansmann, 1980)
and argue that the not-for-prot status enables the management to commit
to a higher level of quality or to ensure that donated money or labor will not
be appropriated for private gain (e.g., Easely and OHara, 1983, Glaeser and
Shleifer, 2001, and Bilodeau and Slivinski, 2004). Another set of theories
(see, Francois, 2000, and 2003) focus on free-riding within a rm and argue
that the not-for-status might be a credible commitment device on the part
of the management to supply less e¤ort than in a for-prot rm, thereby
inducing greater labor donation from intrinsically motivated workers. Both
sets of theories of not-for-prots either show or implicitly assume that they
are a welfare-enhancing institution.
In this paper we re-examine the labor donation theory of not-for-prots
based on free-riding, and show that it suggests an alternative, somewhat
darker view of not-for-prots. The starting point of the labor donation the-
ory is that not-for-prots tend to be concentrated in activities that have a
public good element, and that volunteering is an important source of labor
in these organizations.3 We show that not-for-prot organizations may exist
in these activities because the excess supply of motivated workers makes the
1A study of 26 countries conducted in the mid 1990s (Salamon et al, 1999), for ex-
ample, found that not-for-prots employed an average 6.8 percent of the non-agricultural
workforce (12% in the case of the US). Another study of eight OECD countries about a
decade later (Salamon et al, 2007) show that not-for-prots contributed 8% to GDP on
average (7.2% in the case of the US).
2See Rose-Ackerman (1996) and Francois and Vlassopoulos (2008) for excellent surveys
of the literature.
3Health, education, and social services account for 61% of the contribution of not-for-
prots to GDP on average in the eight countries studied by Salamon et al (2007). About
half of the 14 million full-time employees in the US not-for-prot sector work on voluntary
basis and volunteer time accounts for about a quarter of not-for-prot contribution to
GDP on average in the seven countries studied by Salamon et al (2007).
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non-prot form more attractive to managers without any concomitant gain
in welfare compared to for-prots. The choice between not-for-prot and for-
prot provision is therefore not only a question of resolving incentive prob-
lems but also one of distribution of rents between management and workers.
We then proceed to embed the choice of for-prots vs. not-for-prots in
a labor market setting where rms and workers match endogenously. We
show that if motivated workers are scarce then competition for them would
lead for-prot rms to drive away not-for-prot rms. We also show that if
managers are su¢ ciently motivated, either nancially or intrinsically, they
will switch to for-prots. However, as one would expect, unless worker mo-
tivation crosses some threshold, managers will never choose not-for-prots.
Our goal is not to argue that not-for-prots are undesirable but to high-
light a particular e¤ect that strikes a cautionary note on thinking about
their welfare consequences. The labor donation theory based on free riding
and the theories based on contract failure suggest distinct but not mutually
exclusive mechanisms. In a model that combines both, the negative welfare
results will be mitigated.
Our analysis also highlights the importance of understanding organi-
zational choice between for-prots and not-for-prots in a (labor) market
setting and has several empirical implications. For example, it suggests that
the importance of not-for-prots relative to for-prots within a sector would
depend on, among other things, the relative scarcity of workers. Also, it
implies that measures of labor market slackness (e.g., the unemployment
rate) may be important omitted variables to consider in studies that look
at the e¤ect of not-for-prot status on wages and labor donations.
Our paper starts o¤ with a model of organizational choice similar to
Francois (2003). The basic assumption is that both managers and workers
are intrinsically motivated by the success of the project. E¤ort by either
of the two leads to a successful outcome and the worker moves rst. This
gives rise to a free-rider problem in the rm, as long as the manager has an
incentive to exert e¤ort when the worker did not do so yet. The choice of
not-for-prot status by the owner/manager of a rm can then be understood
as an attempt to resolve the free-rider problem arising within the rm.
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Not-for-prot status is chosen because it reduces nancial incentives for
the management and commits it to non-provision of the public good. This
commitment guarantees workers that their individual contribution will make
a di¤erence in provision and allows managers to reduce the wage payment.
The resulting gain can compensate the manager for lost prots and makes
the not-for-prot an attractive choice for the manager. In other words, the
not-for-prot status is chosen for projects that are nancially not too ben-
ecial because it makes more e¤ective use of the workers intrinsic benets
from public good provision.
However, we show that the adoption of not-for-prot status by the man-
ager increases the burden for the worker. If worker-manager matches arise
endogenously in a labor market, not-for-prot rms can only compete with
for-prot rms when there is an excess supply of motivated workers. If
motivated workers are scarce, not-for-prots are crowded out. This nding
provides a new possible explanation for the association between volunteer
labor and not-for-prot status, namely, the abundance of motivated labor
in some sectors.
If both for-prots and not-for-prots are feasible we show that not-for-
prots are (weakly) dominated by for-prots in terms of welfare. This result
is even stronger if we introduce some uncertainty and projects can fail with
some probability even if either the worker or the manager supplies e¤ort.
An important feature of the model is that organizational choice only
a¤ects the distribution of rents within the rm but not the nature of pro-
duction. We assume that intrinsic motivation is output-based where output
is single-dimensional and there is no second dimension like consumer welfare
or quality. This implies that nancial incentives do not harm consumer or
donor welfare - whoever benets from the project just cares about project
success. We do not do this because we think it is particularly realistic but
in order to separate out the labor donation theory based on free riding from
the contract failure literature in a clear-cut way.
This article is structured as follows. We discuss the related literature
in greater detail in section 2. Section 3 presents the model in three steps.
In sections 3.1 we lay down the basic framework, and in section 3.2 we
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analyze the case of exogenous matching between workers and managers to
derive the basic mechanism by which not-for-prots can arise. In section
3.3 we discuss endogenous matching to show the e¤ects of labor scarcity on
organizational choice. The welfare implications of not-for-prot provision
are discussed in section 3.4. In section 4 we extend our model to show that
the commitment of the manager to no e¤ort via the not-for-prot status
is likely to come with a strict cost in terms of welfare if production has a
stochastic element. Section 5 discusses some empirical implications of our
ndings, and section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The main idea behind the contract failure literature is that by limiting mon-
etary incentives for owners not-for-prots enable the managers to commit to
higher quality (e.g., if there is an underlying cost-quality trade-o¤) and/or
attract key inputs from others (e.g., donations, labor). The key feature
of not-for-prots form the legal and contractual point of view is that they
operate under a non-distribution constraint (Hansmann, 1980, 1987) under
which these organizations cannot distribute residual earnings to individuals
who exercise control over the rm (e.g., o¢ cers, directors, members). They
can earn prots, so long as they are retained for future spending, distributed
to the beneciaries in some form, or given to employees within the organi-
zation without control rights.4 Hansmann (1980) provides a brief analysis
of the role of not-for-prots in signalling and screening managers who vary
(unobservably) in terms of how much weight they put on money versus the
output of the organization. Easely and OHara (1983) model a society that
is interested in maximizing welfare. The basic conict in their framework is
between the manager of a rm and consumers of rm output. They show
that when output cannot be observed by society then managers have an
incentive to raise their own utility and delivering less to the consumers. The
4For example, even if the chief nancial o¢ cer of a university can be given a bonus
payment he can be red by the President or the Board of Trustees, and the latter cannot
be residual claimants.
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nondistribution constraint works to restrain this kind of behavior.
Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) model the incentives of a manager who
chooses between a for- and not-for-prot setting. They argue that prot
incentives might lead to undesirable outcomes from the point of view of
donors who value the non-contractible outcome of the rm. Their argument
is related to the multi-tasking argument of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991).
Motivating an agent on a contractible task (e¤ort in increasing output or
reducing costs) might lead to undesirable outcomes because another non-
contractible task (e¤ort in improving quality) is neglected. They show that
not-for-prots remain attractive for managers because the reduced nancial
incentive in the not-for-prot is compensated for by the increase in dona-
tions.5 A similar argument is made by Bilodeau and Slivinski (2004), who
show that the non-distribution constraint provides the entrepreneur with a
means of committing not to appropriate funds which others wish to assign
to the provision of the public good, and so it induces higher donations by
the public.
An important recent contribution by Francois (2000) provides a formal
analysis of the theory of labor donations. He starts o¤ with the premise
that workers are intrinsically motivated in certain activities. He looks at
an environment where there is a problem of moral hazard in teams or free
riding within the organization. He shows that when workers receive intrinsic
motivation from the provision of an output, the rm faces a public good
problem. If the manager is very motivated to provide the output, he needs
to pay the worker a higher wage to motivate e¤ort because the worker knows
that provision is likely even if he shirks because the manager will step in.
Francois argues that this need to pay higher wages under a for-prot is
the reason why the reduced nancial incentives in the public sector can be
attractive to a social planner, as it would reduce the wage. We follow the
same basic argument but show that if the for-prot is feasible it will weakly
increase welfare compared to not-for-prot provision (and strictly so under
some circumstances).
5Vlassopoulos (2009) show that if one introduces reputational mechanisms in the
Glaeser-Shleifer framework, then for-prot status may dominate not-for-prot status.
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The idea that intrinsic motivation might lead to a wage di¤erential be-
tween the for- and not-for-prot sector has received a fair amount of atten-
tion in empirical work.6 According to our model, one interpretation of this
nding is that managers induce workers to accept lower wages through a
commitment to inactivity, which suggests a gloomier picture of the not-for-
prot status.
While the e¤ect of competition in output markets on the sectoral mix
has been discussed in the theoretical literature on not-for-prots7 the ef-
fect of competition for workers on organizational choice remains relatively
unexplored.8 A related paper in this respect is Besley and Ghatak (2005).
In their model, mission oriented managers and workers have an interest to
match with each other because this implies higher output inside the match.
However, their work does not discuss the role of the nondistribution con-
straint in this context. The benets from motivated agents depend entirely
on the worker-manager match but are independent of the organizational
form. Another related paper is Macchiavello (2008) who study the selec-
tion of motivated workers into the public vs. the private sector and the
ambiguous role that high wage premium in the public sector can play.
3 The Model
3.1 Basic Framework
In this section we present a simple model of organizational choice. A rm
consists of a worker (W ) and a manager (M). For now, we take the match
between the worker and the manager to be exogenously given and will con-
sider later the consequences of how they are matched via a labor market.
The worker provides labor and the manager owns an asset that is required
for production. In addition, the manager can intervene in the production
6See, for example, Mocan and Tekin (2003), Preston (1989), Rose-Ackerman (1996),
and Gregg et al (2008).
7See for example Lakdawalla and Philipson (2006).
8See for example Francois (2003) or Rowat and Seabright (2006) who develop argu-
ments around the lower (e¢ ciency) wage in the not-for-prot sector but do not discuss
competition for workers.
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process by allocating additional resources (e¤ort) once the outcome of worker
e¤ort is observed. Before production starts, the manager chooses the rms
organizational form (i.e., choice between for-prot and not-for-prot status),
sets wages, and terms of employment (e.g., the worker can be red in the
case of bad performance). The worker then accepts or rejects the o¤ered
contract. If she rejects she remains unemployed and the manager proceeds
alone.
Production proceeds as follows. The worker moves rst and chooses
whether to work (eW = 1) or shirk (eW = 0) in the production of rst stage
output (y1), given by y1 = eW . If she exerts e¤ort she incurs an e¤ort cost of
1: Both e¤orts are non-contractible, as in models of moral hazard in teams.
The intermediate output, y1, is observed by the manager but not by any
third party. As a result, either input-based or output-based (or, piece rate)
contracts are not feasible.
Given that the workers e¤ort and output is not veriable, the manager
can only pay a xed wage, w. We follow the literature on e¢ ciency wages
(Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) and implicit contracts (MacLeod and Malcolm-
son, 1989, Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 1994) where the worker is given
a at wage which is chosen such that the he gets a rent, and then if it
turns out he did not supply e¤ort (the performance measure being observ-
able to the manager but non-contractible) he is red.9 As in the literature
on e¢ ciency wages and implicit contracts, we assume that the only legally
veriable pieces of information are money payments and whether or not a
person is employed by a rm (see MacLeod and Malcolmson, 1989). There-
fore, the manager can re a worker even if he exerts e¤ort but has to pay
a wage. This rules out the possibility that the manager can re the worker
even if he exerts e¤ort.
9We show in Appendix G that the main results go through in the case where interme-
diate output is a noisy signal of e¤ort and the manager can contract on it, as in standard
models of moral hazard. We use e¢ ciency wages for simplicity, as well as comparability
with the existing literature (in particular, Francois, 2000, 2003). Also, to keep things as
simple as possible, we assume that the manager nds out from intermediate output the
workers e¤ort choice with certainty. Our results go through if we allow a noisy detection
technology of worker e¤ort (as in the e¢ ciency wage model of Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984).
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If the project is in danger of failing (y1 = 0) the manager decides whether
he wants to exert e¤ort (eM = 1) or not (eM = 0) : Second stage output is
then determined by his e¤ort choice: y2 = eM . The cost of e¤ort by the
manager is c  1 and will be discussed below in more detail.10 An alternative
interpretation of the managers e¤ort cost is that it reects the wage paid
to a replacement worker who is then supervised closely.
Project success (max(y1; y2) = 1) yields a nancial return of . In addi-
tion, we assume that manager and worker are intrinsically motivated. Both
derive some utility from the project being successful. In particular, we as-
sume that the output of the project is a public good to the worker and the
manager. They receive a benet of j (j = W;M) from project success
independently of their own e¤ort and organizational form of the rm.11
As an example, we can think of a research project. If the project is
successful then both the worker (a research assistant, a eld worker, or
a laboratory assistant) and the manager receive a positive non-pecuniary
payo¤ because it helps society in some way. In addition, there are some
nancial benets which can consist of research grants, salary increases, in-
creased budget for the research group, or money obtained from patenting
the innovation. The worker and the manager both have the skill to provide
the appropriate labor input but for reasons of comparative advantage the
worker is hired to do it. However, if the worker does not provide it then
the manager has the choice to step in and save the project, or let it fail.
We assume that not-for-prots are characterized by a non-distribution
constraint, i.e., the manager cannot take home all the prot, , in case of
project success.12 Below we follow the formulation of Glaeser and Shleifer
(2001) of the non-distribution constraint. In particular, we assume that
committing to a non-distribution constraint means that the manager can
10 In this formulation the two types of e¤ort are substitutes (as in Francois, 2000, and
2003) and this naturally exacerbates the problem of free riding. The results go through
so long as the e¤orts are not strong complements.
11 In the terminology of Francois and Vlassopoulos (2008) we assume output-oriented
altruism as opposed to action-oriented altruism.
12The manager could pay himself a at wage and if output was constant, he could
appropriate the prots by setting this wage to be high. If output is variable then he will
not be able to appropriate the surplus with a xed wage.
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still capture some share of the prots . In their interpretation, the share
1    is lost because the managers technology of capturing some of the
prots is ine¢ cient (e.g., in the form of perks) - it is equivalent to burning
a fraction 1   of the prots.13
We allow the manager to choose any  2 [0; 1] : A not-for-prot rm is
then dened by  < 1 and a for-prot rm by  = 1. We assume that the
choice of  has no direct costs.
Following the e¢ ciency wage literature, we assume that the manager can
motivate the worker by threatening to re her in case she is caught shirking
as in standard e¢ ciency wage models. Naturally, the worker will have to
earn some rents for the ring threats to have bite. We assume that the
worker has no liquid wealth and there is a limited liability constraint so that
the workers wage cannot be less than some minimum level (which we assume
to be zero for simplicity). Otherwise, performance bonds or penalties could
be used to give additional incentives. The worker is caught shirking and red
with certainty if eW = 0 and never red if eW = 1. Let   1 denote the
probability of a currently unemployed worker staying unemployed.14 Since
in equilibrium workers do not shirk and are never red, without loss of
generality our analysis will focus on the one-shot payo¤s of managers and
workers.
The timing of the within-period game is as follows. First, the manager
chooses (;w). Workers observe this and apply for a job in the rm. From
the set of workers who apply (whose types, in terms of W , is observable
to the manager), the manager chooses a worker. If a worker rejects, the
manager can proceed alone or costlessly approach another worker with a
new contract. Once the match has been made, the manager pays w to the
worker up front. The worker then decides on eW 2 f0; 1g. Intermediate
13See also Hansmann (1980, p. 873-875) for some anecdotal support for this formulation.
Another possible interpretation is that the share (1  ) goes to the beneciaries in some
form. We discuss the welfare outcomes for both scenarios in section 3.4.
14 In order to keep the model as simple as possible we assume that this probability is
not a¤ected by labor market conditions. For the same reason we assume that there is no
noise in the supervision technology, and once employed a worker who does not shirk keeps
his job forever (i.e., there is no chance of exogenous break up of a match).
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output y1 is observed (without any noise) by the manager but not by any
third party. If eW = 0 the manager decides whether to rescue the project,
i.e., chooses eM 2 f0; 1g. At this stage the manager cannot costlessly hire
another worker. This reects the assumption that there are some delay costs
involved if a worker who is hired does not perform.15 One interpretation
of this is the manager himself steps in and supplies the required e¤ort.
Alternatively, he hires another worker to do it, but has to directly supervise
him, and this is costly (i.e., c > 1). He also decides whether to re the
worker who was originally hired, and hire another worker for next period.
Let eW and e

M denote the e¤ort choice of the worker and the manager
that are induced by the choice of  and w via the incentive-compatibility
constraints of the worker and the manager described below. Let uM and uW
be the outside options of the manager and the worker, respectively. The
managers problem is:
max
f2[0;1];wg
EU(eW ; e

M ) = e

W ( + M ) + (1  eW ) eM ( + M   c)  w
subject to the following constraints:
(i) the participation constraint (PC) of the manager:
EU(eW ; e

M )  uM
(ii) the PC of the worker:
max (eW ; e

M ) W   eW + w  uW ;
(iii) the incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) of the manager:
eM (; ; c; M ) =
(
1 if  + M  c
0 otherwise
; (1)
15 If the manager could substitute immediately an equally motivated worker at equal
cost the ability to commit to no e¤ort would disappear and not-for-prots would never be
found as in Francois (2000, 2003).
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(iv) the ICC of the worker (which is derived in Appendix A):
eW (w; e

M ; W ; ) =
(
1 if W+w 11   w + eMW + 1 

uW +  (1  ) W+w 11 

0 otherwise
(2)
where  < 1 is a discount factor and   1 is the workers probability of
staying unemployed once red. It states that the worker exerts e¤ort if the
present value of wage and intrinsic benet from project success minus e¤ort
costs is higher than the present value of free-riding on manager e¤ort and
being red after one period.
Solving out the ICC of the worker we get
w (eM )  (A  1) eMW +A (1  W ) + uW
where
A  1 + (1  )

:
Notice that, as  < 1 and   1, A > 1: The interpretation of A is it is
the e¢ ciency wage for a worker who has no intrinsic motivation (W = 0)
and unemployment benets of uW = 0. As the cost of e¤ort is 1; and the
outside option is zero, A has to be greater than 1 for the agent to receive
any rents. The lower is  (more impatient is the worker) and the lower is
 (the easier it is for an unemployed worker to nd a job), the larger is the
incentive problem, and so the higher will be A:
To keep the exposition simple, for our basic results we restrict attention
to the case where W  1: This is a su¢ cient condition to rule out negative
wage payments. In addition, it holds that
(A  1) eMW +A (1  W ) + uW  1  W + uW
for A > 1 and W  1 so that we can ignore the worker PC constraint.
The present value of employment is always larger than the present value
of unemployment - at least as long as W  1. We will comment on what
happens in the case W > 1 at the end of the following section.
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We study two cases regarding the worker´s outside option uW . If the
good under question is a pure public good, and an unemployed worker can
observe activity within the rm and receives W even if they themselves
are not working, so long as someone else is, then uW includes W : Other
than this element, if there are some unemployment benets (or some self-
employment technology the worker has access to) which yields u  0 then
uW = u + W : Alternatively, if we assume that workers do not observe
any activity within rms if they are unemployed whether or not the public
good is provided, and who supplies the e¤ort then uW = u. Henceforth, we
normalize u = 0 and denote by W the outside option of a worker, with
 = 1 capturing the pure public good case, and  = 0 capturing the impure
public good case. We will see that the results are similar whether we assume
that the rm produces a public good that is observed outside the rm or a
local public good that can only be observed inside the rm. When we allow
for endogenous matching, the outside option will also depend on the best
o¤er made by another organization trying to hire this worker.
The managers ICC in equation (1) states that nancial plus intrinsic
benets of the project must be higher than the intervention cost c for him
to exert e¤ort. Throughout, in order to focus on the interesting cases, we
restrict attention to parameter values that satisfy:
Assumption A1 :   c  M  0 :
If A1 is violated the manager is either always committed to no e¤ort (i.e.,
 + M < c) or never committed to no e¤ort (M > c).
The manager PC is given by the expected benets of the contract (;w)
chosen by the manager and his outside option. We assume that the alterna-
tive to the contract (;w) is manager provision.16 Under this assumption,
the managers outside option is:
uM =  + M   c:
16We make this assumption to be as general as possible. If the alternative is another
worker with equal or lower intrinsic motivation the manager PC is always satised.
13
The managers PC can then be rewritten as
eW ( + M )  w + (1  eW ) eM ( + M   c)   + M   c: (3)
3.2 Organizational Choice
The not-for-prot status comes at the cost of decreased rents to the manager,
but with the benet of lower wages. It will be chosen if the latter outweighs
the former. This section derives necessary and su¢ cient conditions for this
to be the case.
The key to understanding the role of not-for-prots lies in the manager
ICC, namely, equation (1). The inequality shows that reducing the prot
share  reduces the incentives of the manager to bail out a failing project
because it reduces his nancial benet from project success. In other words,
not-for-prot status can be used to reach commitment vis a vis the worker.
If  is su¢ ciently low in the not-for-prot, the worker knows that her e¤ort
will be crucial for project success. This ability of the not-for-prot to commit
the manager to no e¤ort is crucial for its attractiveness from the perspective
of the manager. If A1 is violated the choice of  does not a¤ect either the
managers incentives (1) or the workers incentives (2). Since lowering 
from 1 directly reduces the managers utility,  < 1 is never chosen if the
inequalities in A1 are not fullled.
If A1 if fullled, however, the manager can commit to let the project fail
(eM = 0) by adopting not-for-prot status. Formally, commitment is reached
if the prot share satises:
   where   c  M

:
The interpretation is, the monetary benet  is lower than the costs
over and above what the manager is compensated for by intrinsic motiva-
tion, c   M . The threshold  follows immediately from the managers
ICC, namely, equation (1). It is important to note that in this model the
reduction of nancial incentives has no direct positive e¤ects (like increased
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investments or quality) but only serves as a commitment device for the man-
ager. However, we show below that the advantage of not-for-prot status
for the manager is that it might reduce wage payments.
From the workers ICC, equation (2), the minimum wage needed to in-
duce worker e¤ort can be written as:
w (eM ) = A (1  W ) + (A  1) eMW + W : (4)
We show:
Lemma 1 Assume A1 holds. Then not-for-prots with    have to pay
a smaller wage to workers to motivate worker e¤ort (eW = 1) than any rm
with  > , in particular,  = 1.
Proof. For eM = 0 from (4) we get:
w (0) = A(1  W ) + W
and for eM = 1, it is:
w(1) = A  W + W :
As A > 1, w (0) < w(1) for all 1  W  0: Now the proof follows from the
fact that non-prots with    commit the manager to inactivity (i.e.,
eM = 0).
Lemma 1 states that the incentive-compatible wage is lower in not-for-
prots than in for-prots. The intuition is simple: if the manager is very
motivated he saves the project in case it is about to fail (eM = 1) and the
worker receives W regardless of her e¤ort level. She is then tempted to free-
ride on the public good provision by the manager and a higher e¢ ciency wage
is needed to motivate her to supply e¤ort. In the not-for-prot the manager
can reduce the prot share to  and commit to eM = 0. This increases
e¤ort incentives for the worker because the worker now knows that without
her e¤ort the project will fail.
Henceforth we will refer to w(0) as wNP and w(1) as wFP : Table 1
summarizes the optimal wages and prot share for for-prots and not-for-
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Optimal Wage (w) Optimal Prot Share ()
for-prot wFP = A  W + W FP = 1
not-for-prot wNP = A (1  W ) + W  = c M
Table 1: Optimal Wages and Prot Shares
prots. The optimal prot share in the not-for-prot is  because any
further reduction would just reduce the retained prots of the manager but
would not have any impact on the wage. Table 1 shows that e¢ ciency wages
are reduced by worker intrinsic motivation both in the for and not-for-prot.
However, the wage reduction is higher in the not-for-prot.17
The payo¤ of the manager under a not-for-prot is  + M   wNP
while his payo¤ under a for-prot is +M  wFP : The PCs of the manager
under these two organizational forms are:
 + M   wNP   + M   c
and
 + M   wFP   + M   c:
These can be rewritten as:
c   + M   c+ wNP
and
c  wFP :
These conditions are intuitive. They mean that the wage in the not-for-
prot plus the prot lost due to not-for-prot status needs to be smaller
17This is similar to the result in Besley and Ghatak (2005) that motivated workers
are given less high-powered incentive schemes which results in lower expected wages, and
like it, suggests that workers, if possible, would like to conceal their intrinsic motivation.
We abstract from issues of observability of intrinsic motivation (or lack thereof), and
consequently, the role of signalling and screening (see Benabou and Tirole, 2006 and
Delfgaauw and Dur, 2007)
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than the e¤ort cost for the manager in autarchy. In the for-prot the wage
has to be smaller than the managers cost of e¤ort. Substituting values of
wNP and wFP the manager PCs can be simplied to:
NP : c   + M +A (1  W ) + W
2
(5)
FP : c  A  W + W : (6)
Now we turn to characterizing conditions when a not-for-prot will be
chosen. We make the following assumption:
Assumption A2 : c > max

 + M + 1 A;  + M + 
2

:
This is a necessary condition for not-for-prots to satisfy the managers
PC for W  1. If c is too low relative to the project benets then the
manager will never nd it attractive to choose the not-for-prot and will
prefer autarchy.
Given A1 and A2 we can characterize the trade-o¤ between reduced
nancial return and reduced wages that can lead to not-for-prots being
preferred to for-prots:
Proposition 1 Assume A1 and A2 hold. The manager prefers the not-for-
prot to a for-prot if and only if
W  max

 + M   c
A  1 ;
A+  + M   2c
A  

(7)
However, workers never prefer the not-for-prot to a for-prot because the
not-for-prot wage is lower.
Proof. See appendix B.
The intuition to the rst part of the proposition is simple. If worker
intrinsic motivation is high, the manager benets from a not-for-prot be-
cause it reduces wages substantially. The loss of prot from adopting the
not-for-prot status relative to the for-prot status is (1  ), which can
be rewritten  + M   c. In other words, not-for-prot status leads to a
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bigger loss if the project is very attractive from the managers point of view.
Therefore, the manager prefers the not-for-prot to the for-prot if his -
nancial and intrinsic benets from the project are not too high relative to
the intrinsic motivation of the worker.
The workers preference for the for-prot is surprising given the usual
perception that intrinsically motivated workers prefer not-for-prot rms.
In our model, under both the for-prot and the not-for-prot, the output
is the same but the former pays a higher wage. E¤ectively, in not-for-prot
rms, the manager free rides on the intrinsically motivated worker.18
This highlights an important di¤erence to other models in the literature
which derive not-for-prot status from contractual failure vis a vis the bene-
ciary. The di¤erence becomes clear if we re-interpret the worker as a donor.
In our model, the not-for-prot is a commitment device by the manager to
stay inactive if the donor does not donate to the rm. This commitment
increases donations but does not necessarily improve the welfare of the ben-
eciary. If the donor could choose he would donate to a for-prot.
Notice that our result is driven by the fact that managers will produce
the public good even if they do not nd a motivated worker, which is ensured
by Assumption A1: It might seem that this biases the choice against not-
for-prots. But if A1 does not hold, then not-for-prots cannot exist as the
manager is either always committed to no e¤ort or always committed to
supply e¤ort.
It should be stressed that this result is robust to a modication of the
contractual environment. In particular, we show in the appendix that propo-
sition 1 holds as well if the manager can contract on intermediate output
and, thus, pay an incentive wage to the worker.
Our framework allows us to examine the e¤ects of changes in manager
and worker motivation on organizational choice very clearly.
By A1 the existence of a not-for-prot industry generally depends on a
relatively low level of intrinsic benets M : If M > c, Assumption A1 is
18This relies on the assumption that the intrinsic motivation W is the same in both
cases. If motivation is not observable then working in a not-for-prot for a low wage could
serve as a signal that one is pro-social (as in Benabou and Tirole, 2006).
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violated and the not-for-prot looses its ability to commit the manager to
no e¤ort. As a result, for-prots are always chosen. On the other hand, if
M = 0; not-for-prots can exist so long as the conditions in Proposition
1 are satised. Also, a rise in nancial benets, ; makes the adoption of
not-for-prot status less attractive. We summarize this as:
Observation 1 The greater are nancial project benets () or intrinsic
motivation of the manager ( M ) the less likely not-for-prots will be
the chosen organizational form.
The intuition is simple. Since the key issue is free-riding, if the manager is
very motivated, it is increasingly costly to commit not to work on the project
in case the worker shirks and the not-for-prot form becomes increasingly
unattractive. This provides a theory of the choice between for-prot social
enterprises and not-for-prots. Social enterprises can be organized as either
for-prots or not-for-prots and combine a revenue generating business with
a social value generating component. They pursue what is often referred to
as a double bottom-line which is a combination of prot and mission-related
impact. It is argued that revenue generation allows social enterprises to be
self-sustaining and prots attract additional capital to solve social ills.19
Next we turn to worker motivation. Clearly, if workers are unmotivated
(W = 0) then not-for-prots will never be chosen. Proposition 1 shows that
worker motivation will have to exceed some positive threshold for not-for-
prots to become an attractive option.
Observation 2 If the worker has very low intrinsic motivation then for-
prots will be preferred by the manager.
What happens if workers are very motivated? Recall that so far we have
restricted attention to W  1 to keep the exposition simple. Now let us
consider the implications of allowing W > 1: The worker PCs now start
to play a role. The commitment to inactivity by the manager in the not-
for-prot rm makes workers worse o¤ when they shirk than when they are
19See Martin and Osberg (2007) and Bornstein (2004).
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unemployed. Formally, the worker PC looks like
W   1 + w  W
inserting the not-for-prot wage
A(1  W )  1  W
which binds at W = 1. Hence, for W > 1 the not-for-prot wage that
satises the PC is wNP = 1   W + W . Since the PC is binding, an
e¢ ciency wage premium is no longer paid to these workers to incentivize
them. The fact that they are very motivated and that under not-for-prots
managers can credibly commit not to supply e¤ort if the worker shirks, is
enough to incentivize them.
Notice that for  = 0 (output is not observable outside of the rm),
wNP < 0, whereas for  = 1; wNP = 1: The intuition is as follows: in the
former case, in e¤ect the project is an impure public good to the worker
and the benets accrue only if the worker works for the rm than otherwise.
This allows the manager to o¤er the worker a negative wage. In the latter
case, the project is a pure public good to the worker and therefore, the rm
will have to o¤er him at least the cost of e¤ort, otherwise, the worker will
prefer not to work for the rm since someone else will supply the requisite
e¤ort.
Turning to for-prot wages, recall that wFP= A W+W : The worker
PC can be rewritten as w  1   W + W : As A > 1, comparing the two,
we can see that for for-prots the PC never binds. Under a for-prot the
manager cannot commit not to supply e¤ort if the worker does not, and this
means the worker will have to be paid an e¢ ciency wage premium to supply
e¤ort which (by denition) is not possible if the PC binds.
Inserting the for-prot and not-for-prot wages in the case where W > 1
in the condition for not-for-prots to be chosen, i.e., wFP wNP  +M c;
we get
A  1   + M   c
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which suggests comparative static results that are similar to Proposition 1.
Observation 3 If workers are very motivated ( W > 1) not-for-prots can
elicit worker e¤ort by paying them a at wage that respects their partic-
ipation constraint, without using an e¢ ciency wage mechanism. The
at wage will be negative if W accrues to the worker only if the worker
works for the rm. Otherwise it will be positive and equal to the cost
of e¤ort.
An example might illustrate the relevance of this case. There is a quickly
growing industry of volunteer tourism which combines typical backpacking
trips with development work (see Guttentag, 2009). In this sector, not-
for-prot as well as for-prot rms provide local development work for the
traveler. Most of the eld work requires only unskilled labor, available in
abundance in the local community. Still, volunteers are intrinsically so mo-
tivated that they are willing to pay the organization to get work. The
labor market therefore features payments from the worker to the organiza-
tion (a negative wage) in return for the opportunity to make a di¤erence. It
has been noted that not-for-prots still dominate this industry (Guttentag,
2009) and that these volunteers are increasing the supply of unskilled labour
in local labour markets.
3.3 Labor Markets and Organizational Choice
This section extends the model derived in the previous section to a labor
market setting where a number of workers and managers match endoge-
nously. The aim of this exercise is to show that labor market conditions
and organizational choice are closely linked, a point that existing theories of
not-for-prots have ignored.
Assume that there are M managers with intrinsic motivation M  0,
Nm motivated workers with W > 0 and Nu unmotivated or neutral workers
with W = 0. In what follows we assume that there is some unemployment,
Nu + Nm > M . However, we will allow the degree to which motivated
workers are scarce to vary, i.e., Nm ?M .
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At the matching stage managers choose a contract (;w) to maximize
their expected utility EU(eW ; e

M ) subject to the PC of themselves and that
of the worker. A stable matching is one where no change of match could
strictly increase a managers or workers utility without making the new
matching partner worse o¤ compared to how she was before. Production
takes place once a stable matching is reached.
Note rst, that the observation of rm output in the pure public good
case,  = 1; now leads to a benet of
UW =
MP
i6=j
max (eiW ; e

iM ) W
to all workers j where i is an index for all managers in di¤erent matches.
By assumption A1 worker j expects a provision level of UW = (M   1) W
in all other rms independently of her participation in the o¤ered contract.
Our analysis of the worker PC in section 3.1 still applies. The worker only
worries about the marginal impact of the rejection of her contract when
considering an o¤er.
A crucial question for the e¤ect of the labor market on organizational
choice is whether the for-prot organizational form can satisfy the managers
PC. Assume rst that for-prots are feasible in the sense that the manager
always prefers to be in a for-prot than to produce alone.
Proposition 2 Assume A1 and that for-prot provision is feasible, i.e.,
c  A   W + W . If motivated labor is scarce (Nm < M) then not-for-
prot rms cannot exist in labor market equilibrium.
Proof. We prove the proposition by contradiction. Assume that there are
some not-for-prots in a matching equilibrium with Nm < M . As motivated
workers are scarce (Nm < M) there are some managers who are matched
with an unmotivated worker. These managers will always set up for-prot
rms because not-for-prot status does not reduce their wage bill, wFP = A.
A worker in a not-for-prot rm can therefore improve her position by replac-
ing an unmotivated worker in a for-prot match. The manager will accept
this swap because he (weakly) prefers a for-prot match with a motivated
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worker to a for-prot match with an unmotivated worker. Formally, the
worker PC is now
max (eW ; e

M ) W   eW + w +  UW
 W   1 +A+ W +  UW
which implies that the o¤er
 
; wNP

is not feasible because it leads to a
violation of the worker PC.
An immediate corollary is:
Corollary 1 Assume A1 and that for-prot provision is feasible, c  A  
W+W . If motivated workers are abundant (Nm > M) then not-for-prots
can exist in labor market equilibrium and Proposition 1 applies.
Proposition 2 provides a pessimistic view of not-for-prot rms. It states
that if the adoption of not-for-prot status is motivated by the desire to use
intrinsic motivation of workers to reduce wages then a slack labor market
is a necessary condition for this to be feasible. The reason is simply that
given a choice, workers always want to work for a higher wage. As we
showed in the previous section, the incentive-compatible wage rate is lower
in a not-for-prot than in a for-prot. Therefore, in a situation of labor
surplus, not-for-prots can exist. But in a labor-scarce situation, only the
higher wage rate is relevant and so not-for-prots will be crowded out of the
market by for-prots.
An important insight from this result is that the choice between not-for-
prot and for-prot provision is not always a question of resolving incentive
problems but also one of distribution of rents. In both organizational forms
the worker provides the good at e¤ort cost of 1. The only di¤erence is the
wage that the manager has to pay the worker. From this point of view, the
not-for-prot is a method of redistributing rents towards the manager of the
rm.
Therefore, our analysis suggests that organizational choice would de-
pend on, among other things, the relative scarcity of workers and managers.
If workers are abundant then managers can choose their preferred organi-
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zational form as if they were matched exogenously with a worker. Under
A1 and A2 this situation is captured by condition (7). Not-for-prots are
chosen when the wage reduction compensates the manager for the reduced
nancial gains. Workers have to swallow the resulting reduction in wages
because there is an oversupply of motivated labor.
While we do not focus on this, the endogenous matching framework
o¤ers an explanation why we observe the coexistence of for-prots and not-
for-prots in some sectors. Assuming motivated workers are not scarce,
if there is heterogeneity in some parameter such as M , condition (7) can
hold for some managers and not for others. If for-prots and not-for-prots
coexist, for-prots will be led by more motivated managers.
So far we have compared the not-for-prot status directly with the for-
prot status. The picture changes somewhat if managers prefer working
alone to setting up for-prot rms.
Proposition 3 Assume A1 and A2. Regardless of the relative scarcity of
managers and workers
 
M R Nm

there is a not-for-prot sector if the man-
agers PC can be satised in the not-for-prot but not in the for-prot, i.e.
if
A  c
1    W 
A+  + M   2c
A   :
Proof. See appendix C.
According to Proposition 3 not-for-prots could play a role in industries
that are not attractive to for-prot rms. The reason is that not-for-prots
lead to a redistribution of rents towards owners of assets and can therefore
make setting up a rm easier. The conditions in the proposition indicate that
not-for-prots arise as long as the available projects are not too attractive
(both in terms of pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns) for the manager
and for intermediate values of worker intrinsic motivation.
An interesting comparative static result that follows directly from Propo-
sitions 2 and 3 is that, as c rises for-prots can become feasible, and an indus-
try that produces public goods might change from not-for-prot provision
to for-prot provision. If we interpret c as the level of specialization in the
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labor force, not-for-prots will be most common in industries that combine
high level of worker intrinsic motivation with a low level of specialization.20
3.4 Welfare
So far we have focused on the choice between not-for-prots and for-prots
from the point of view of the manager. In this section we discuss the welfare
implications. In order to keep the focus on the comparison between not-for-
prots and for-prots we assume throughout that the managers PC does
not bind in any of the two organizational forms.
Before we turn towards the welfare implications, however, we turn to-
wards a brief discussion of rst-best e¤ort. First-best e¤ort maximizes total
surplus. For the second stage this implies that the manager should exert
e¤ort (eM = 1) if y1 = 0 and
 + W + M   c  0
and eM = 0 otherwise. Notice that A1 implies that the above condition
holds. Also, the condition for the worker to exert e¤ort (eW = 1) in the rst
stage is  + W + M   1  0, and this is implied by the above condition
as by assumption c  1:
Not-for-prots commit the manager to no e¤ort in our model because a
share of prots (1  ) cannot be captured by him. The rst question is
whether the share of prot that is lost to the manager is a deadweight loss
(as in Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001), because, for example, he consumes it in
the form of perks even though he would have preferred to have it in the form
of cash, or whether it is redistributed towards the beneciary of the project
(as in Easly and O´Hara, 1983). If we assume the former, then choosing
not-for-prots over for-prots will always decrease welfare. This is because
the e¤ort allocation does not change but not-for-prots waste resources by
20This comparative static is partly supported by a survey among 1900 persons respon-
sible for human resources (HR) in the voluntary sector in England (Clark (2007)). The
study shows that vacancies which require specic skills were most likely to be categorized
as hard to ll by the HR personal. It is not clear, however, whether this was due to general
scarcities or a not-for-prot phenomena.
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making it harder for the manager to capture the prot.
If the prot share (1  ) is redistributed and not wasted, both orga-
nizational forms are equivalent in terms of welfare. To see this, note that
all that matters for welfare in this case is who exerts e¤ort. In both the
for-prot and the not-for-prot the manager pays the worker an e¢ ciency
wage so that the worker does supply e¤ort, and, therefore, the cost of pro-
duction is one. For-prot and not-for-prot are therefore equivalent in terms
of welfare. The only di¤erence between the organizational forms is that the
not-for-prot distributes more of the gains to the manager (and to a third
party) and less to the worker. However, as we will see in the next section,
the equivalence between for- and not-for-prots depends on our strong as-
sumption that production is non-stochastic and it is su¢ cient for either the
worker or the manager to supply e¤ort for the project to go through.
4 Extension: Stochastic Project Success
The basic model presented above is based on a particular simplifying as-
sumption. Removing it will add an extra e¤ect that will go against the
choice of not-for-prots. In particular, the assumption that the project al-
ways succeeds in case of worker e¤ort reduces the welfare loss caused by
manager commitment in the not-for-prot. If projects could fail despite
worker e¤ort then there is a positive role to be played by an active manager.
To see this, assume that worker and manager e¤ort lead to project success
with a probability h < 1. The ICC of the manager changes to:
eM (h; ; ; c; M ) =
(
1 if h ( + M )  c
0 otherwise
:
From the ICC we can see immediately that the  that commits the
manager to no e¤ort is now
 =
c
h   M

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which implies that assumption A1 has to be modied to
Assumption A3 :   c
h
  M  0:
We derive the two e¢ ciency wages in appendix D, they are
wNP = A (1  hW ) + hW
for the not-for-prot and
wFP = A (1  hW ) + (Ah  1)hW + hW
for the for-prot, where A  1+(1 ) as before.
First note, that the for-prot wage can now actually be lower than the
not-for-prot wage if Ah < 1. This is because the worker benets from being
employed in a company that has a motivated manager even if the worker
exerts e¤ort himself. If h is relatively small this factor weighs more heavily.
Intuitively, an increasing failure rate 1   h increases the chance that the
manager has to exert e¤ort despite worker e¤ort. This additional benet
is reected in e¢ ciency wages. In order to make not-for-prot dominance
possible we need to assume that
Assumption A4 : Ah  1
so that wFP  wNP . For non-negativity of wages it then su¢ ces to assume
that W < 1h .
We discuss the manager PCs in appendix E. As before, in order for the
not-for-prot to be feasible we need to assume that
Assumption A5 : c  max

h ( + M + W )
2
; h ( + M )  Ah  1
2  h

:
Given these assumptions it is still possible that the not-for-prot is cho-
sen by the manager. However, this can only be the case if the wage gains
compensate the manager not only for lost prots but also for a loss in pro-
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ductivity. To see this, note that the manager prefers the not-for-prot if
h ( + M )  wNP
 h ( + M )  wFP + (1  h) [h ( + M )  c] :
where the third term on the right-hand side represents the productivity
benet for the manager. If the project is about to fail (with probability
1 h) the manager in the for-prot can intervene. The following proposition
then characterizes the conditions under which not-for-prots will be chosen:
Proposition 4 Assume that A3, A4 and A5 hold. The manager prefers the
not-for-prot to the for-prot if
W  max

2  h
(Ah  1)h (h ( + M )  c) ;
A+ h ( + M )  2c
h (A  )

:
Proof. See appendix F.
Proposition 4 follows proposition 1 closely in the intuition. It states
that not-for-prots can be preferred if worker intrinsic motivation is large
compared to the benets of project success.
The e¢ ciency gain in the for-prot also makes for-prot status more at-
tractive to the worker because the average provision rate is higher under that
organizational form. Hence, for-prots dominate not-for-prots in terms of
welfare even if the not-for-prot does not waste resources (i.e., the fraction
1  goes to third parties). To see this note that welfare under a for-prot
is higher if
h ( + M + W )  1 + (1  h) (h ( + M + W )  c)
> h ( + M + W )  1
where the left-hand-side displays welfare under a for-prot and the right-
hand side is the welfare under a not-for-prot. By assumption A3 this is
always satised because h ( + M + W ) > c.
In summary, our analysis above o¤ers an interesting insight concerning
the choice of not-for-prot status. Even if not-for-prots may yield lower
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expected surplus than for-prots, they might be chosen because of the rent
extraction (i.e., paying the worker low wages) vs. e¢ ciency trade-o¤ that
the manager faces. Even if it is socially e¢ cient for both the worker and
the manager to supply e¤ort, the manager might want to tie his hands and
commit not to supply e¤ort if the need arises, in order to relax the workers
ICC.
5 Discussion
Our analysis suggests that organizational choice between for-prots and not-
for-prots would depend on, among other things, the relative scarcity of
workers and managers. In particular, the abundance of motivated labor in
some sectors may lead to the rise of not-for-prot organizations. Figure 1
provides a crude look at the existing cross-country evidence regarding the
connection between not-for-prot (paid) employment and unemployment
rates.21 For comparability we only focus on OECD countries. The graph
shows a suggestive pattern with respect to groups of countries. Countries
with very low unemployment rates (Sweden, Norway, Japan and Finland)
also feature the least employment in not-for-prot rms. Most European
continental countries as well as Australia, the US and UK feature both
higher unemployment rates and higher not-for-prot employment. This
pattern is only broken by Spain and Italy which feature both higher un-
employment and low not-for-prot involvement.22 Clearly we cannot infer
anything causal from this correlation, but it does suggest that with richer
data macroeconomic factors such as unemployment rates (as well as institu-
tional factors like the regulatory regime) might be useful in understanding
the prevalence of not-for-prots. Our argument is, for example, consistent
with some of the data presented in Mocan and Tekin (2003). Their evidence
on worker selection show that weak labor market participants like Blacks
and Hispanics are overrepresented in not-for-prots. While this could be
21Not-for-prot employment data (1991-1996) is from Salamon (1999). Unemployment
rates (1990) are from the the CIA World Factbook.
22Dropping the three countries with double-digit unemployment makes the correlation
signicant at 5% level.
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driven by factors such as not-for-prots being less likely to discriminate, it
is also consistent with our model.
More generally, our nding that labor market conditions a¤ect organiza-
tional choice is relevant for empirical analysis as it suggests that measures
of labor market slackness (for specic worker characteristics) might be an
important omitted variable in studies that look at the e¤ect of not-for-prot
status on wages and labor donations. For example, unemployment is most
likely correlated with typical dependent variables like wages (negative cor-
relation) and labor donations (positive correlation) and might therefore bias
the coe¢ cient on not-for-prot status upwards.
Our model suggests that employment in the not-for-prot sector should
go up in a recession. By Proposition 2, a fall in the number of job openings
or rms (which can be interpreted as a fall in M) relative to the number of
motivated workers (Nm) will cause employment to go up in the not-for-prot
sector. Also, by observation 1, a fall in nancial prots () will result in
greater employment in the not-for-prot sector.
These implications of the model are consistent with available evidence.
For example, the counter-cyclical behavior of employment in the not-for-
prot sector is well documented. In particular, during recessions employ-
ment in not-for-prots goes up while for-prot employment declines. For
example, Salamon and Sokolowski (2006) show that between 2002-2004 both
the paid and volunteer portions of the not-for-prot workforce grew by over
5 percent in the US, whereas overall employment in the economy declined by
0.2 percent. Salamon and Geller (2010) point out that despite the recession
underway at the time, not-for-prot employment in Maryland continued its
growth in 2008, increasing by 2.7 percent between the fourth quarter of
2007 and the fourth quarter of 2008. By contrast, for-prot employment
in Maryland decreased by 3.3 percent during this same period, eliminating
over 61,000 jobs. The authors note that the not-for-prot sector accounted
for all of the states private employment growth between 2007 and 2008,
demonstrating its role as a critical counter-cyclical force.
In addition, Observation 1 suggests that if the nancial prot () com-
ponent of projects become more important, for-prots will displace not-for-
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prots. This too is consistent with available evidence. For example, the
growth in the market share of for-prot providers is well-documented in the
context of the US health-care sector and expanded health insurance cover-
age is considered to be one of the key contributing factors (see, for example,
Frank and Salkever, 1994). Interestingly, between 1970 and 1995, 330 out
of approximately 5000 (about 7%) not-for-prot hospitals in the US con-
verted to for-prot corporate form and the key factor driving this trend is
considered to be nancial considerations, i.e, protability (see, Cutler and
Horwitz, 2000).
6 Conclusion
In this paper we re-examine the labor donation theory of not-for-prots
based on free-riding developed by Francois (2000, 2003). We embed the
choice of for-prots vs. not-for-prots in a labor market setting where rms
and workers match endogenously. We show that motivated workers are bet-
ter o¤ working in a for-prot rm compared to a not-for-prot rm. We
show that if rms had to compete for workers not-for-prot rms would be
competed out by for-prot rms. As a result we conclude that the reason
for the existence of not-for-prot organizations may be because of the excess
supply of motivated workers that make the non-prot form more attractive
to managers. We also show that, assuming both organizational forms are
feasible, for-prots welfare dominate not-for-prots, and strictly so, if pro-
duction involves some uncertainty.
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7 Appendix
A E¢ ciency Wage
The worker is assumed to be innitely lived. If the worker is employed and
exerts e¤ort, she is not red, and receives the present value of
E = W + w   1 + E
=
W + w   1
1   :
We assume here that the worker is red with certainty if she shirks and
remains unemployed with probability  once she is in that state. An unem-
ployed worker receives a per period payo¤ of uW . Therefore, if unemployed,
the worker earns a present value of
U = uW +  (U + (1  )E) :
This simplies to
U =
uW
1   +
 (1  )
1  
W + w   1
1   :
where we inserted the present value of employment with e¤ort.
If the worker shirks she is caught with certainty, and her present value
of utility is
S = w + eMW + U:
The dependence on eM reects the assumption that the manager cannot
immediately replace a worker if she is red, and will have to supply e¤ort
himself for that period.
The worker exerts e¤ort if
E  S
or
W + w   1
1    w + e

MW + 
2 (1  )
1  
W + w   1
1   + 
uW
1  :
32
Equation (2) follows immediately.
B Proof of Proposition 1
The manager prefers the not-for-prot to a for-prot if
 + M   wNP   + M   wFP :
Given A1,  lies between zero and 1. Inserting  = c M and re-arranging,
we get:
wFP   wNP   + M   c:
Inserting wFP and wNP we get:
A  W  A (1  W )   + M   c
or
W   + M   c
A  1 :
Also, the condition for not-for-prots to satisfy the managers PC is, rewrit-
ing (5):
W   + M +A  2c
A  
Given A2 this condition is consistent with W  1 for both  = 0; 1: The
above two conditions can be combined as (7). Given A2 (which ensures that
the right hand side of (7) is less than 1) we know that there is a range of
values of W  1 that can satisfy this condition.
The worker prefers the not-for-prot if
W + w
NP > W + w
FP
which, given Lemma 1 is never the case. This completes the proof.
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C Proof of Proposition 3
The relevant choice for the manager is between working alone and setting up
a not-for-prot. Therefore, the relevant condition combines the condition
for a not-for-prot to be chosen over autarchy, and for-prots not satisfying
the managers PC, i.e., rewriting inequalities (5) and (6) in terms of W and
combining them.
D Wages with Stochastic Success
If the worker is employed and exerts e¤ort, she is not red, and receives the
present value of
E = hW + (1  h) pW + w   1 + E
=
hW + (1  h) pW + w   1
1  
where p 2 f0; hg is the probability that the manager will provide the good.
The unemployed worker has an expected utility of
U = hW +  (U + (1  )E)
=
hW
1   +
 (1  )
1  
hW + (1  h) pW + w   1
1   :
If the worker shirks her present value of utility is
S = w + pW + U:
The worker exerts e¤ort if
E  S
or
hW + (1  h) pW + w   1
1    w+pW+
hW
1  +
2 (1  )
1  
hW + (1  h) pW + w   1
1   :
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Simplifying, and solving for w we get:
w 

1 + (1  )


1  hW +

h  
1 + (1  )

pW

+ hW
Therefore, the wage in the not-for-prot is:
wNP  A (1  hW ) + hW :
In the for-prot, it is:
wFP  A

1  hW +

h  1
A

hW

+ hW
which simplies to the condition given in the text.
E Manager PCs with Stochastic Success
The managers PC in the for-prot is
h ( + M )  wFP + (1  h) (h ( + M )  c)  h ( + M )  c
or
c  h (1  h) ( + M ) +A  (A (1  h) + 1)hW + hW
h
:
In the not-for-prot, it is:
h ( + M )  wNP  h ( + M )  c
or
c  h ( + M + W ) +A (1  hW )
2
:
Given the restriction hW  1 we need to assume that
c  h ( + M + W )
2
:
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Also, as will be seen in the proof to proposition 4, we need
c  h ( + M )  Ah  1
2  h :
F Proof of Proposition 4
The proof for Proposition 4 is similar to the proof of Proposition 2. The
condition for the not-for-prot is preferred is:
h ( + M )  wNP
 h ( + M )  wFP + (1  h) (h ( + M )  c) :
Plugging in
 =
c
h   M

and the wages, we get:
c 

1 + (1  )


(1  hW )
 h ( + M ) 

1 + (1  )


1  hW +

h  
1 + (1  )

hW

+(1  h) (h ( + M )  c) :
After rearranging and with A = 1+(1 ) we get:
W  2  h
(Ah  1)h (h ( + M )  c) :
The PC of the manager in the not-for-prot is:
h ( + M )  wNP  h ( + M )  c
or,
W  A+ h ( + M )  2c
h (A  ) :
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G Contractible Output
Assume that intermediate output in contractible so that a wage can be paid
on it. Assume, as before, that manager and worker move consecutively.
First the worker chooses eW 2 f0; 1g then, after observing project outcome
the manager: (a) pays w to the worker when it succeeds and 0 when it fails;
and (b) chooses eM 2 f0; 1g. The probability of project success in each stage
is
pi =
(
h if ei = 1
0 if ei = 0
1 > h > 0 and i =M;W:
where we assume pi = 0 if ei = 0 just for simplicity. Assume, as before, and
e¤ort cost of 1 for the worker and c  1 for the manager.
Before the game starts the manager maximizes
EUM
w;
= pW (   w + M ) + (1  pW ) fpM ( + M )  ceMg:
The manager exerts e¤ort eM = 1 i¤
h ( + M )  c  0
or
eM =
(
1 if h ( + M )  c
0 otherwise
(8)
The worker maximizes
EUW = pW (w + W ) + (1  pW ) pMW   eW :
He chooses eW = 1 i¤
h (w + W ) + (1  h) pMW   1  pMW
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so that
eW =
(
1 if h (w + (1  pM ) W )  1
0 otherwise
: (9)
Note that the incentive to exert e¤ort is decreasing in pM (like it is
decreasing in eM in the e¢ ciency wage model) for W > 0:
As the manager ICC looks exactly as in the stochastic project success
case we can directly adopt the calculation of
 =
c
h   M

and the necessary assumption A3.
For simplicity, we assume that the participation constraints are fullled
and that the worker cannot be paid a negative wage w  0: Assume that
the manager wants to use the workers input in both organizational forms
(i.e., c is su¢ ciently large).
From the workers ICC we know that the for-prot wage is:
wFP = max

0;
1
h
  (1  h) W

and the not-for-prot wage is given by:
wNP = max

0;
1
h
  W

:
which implies , wFP  wNP by h > 0:
The manager prefers the not-for-prot if
h
 
   wNP + M
  h     wFP + M+ (1  h) (h ( + M )  c) :
Substituting the values of wFP ; wNP ; and  we get:
W  (2  h) h ( + M )  c
h2
This condition similar to the one in Proposition 1 in the paper.
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Figure 1:Not-for-profit employment and unemployment rates in OECD countries
